Acadia University Marketing analysis and suggestion Essay

Acadia University Marketing analysis and suggestion - Essay Example media networks such as blogs, online video sharing, podcasts, microblogging and virtual worlds have eventually become tools for public relations (Thulasiraman, He & Hu, 2007). Social Media is has also become an essential marketing tool for universities. Universities have had a number of challenges including decreased funding from governments, declining enrolment and increased competition. Since the university is a very wide marketplace, Acadia University will utilize the social media to advertise its courses and dates of enrollment. This is a cost effective marketing tool that will ensure the University reaches more than one billion users of social media across the globe at a very low cost. The international market for university education is a good opportunity for Acadia University. This is because the international market has the advantage of improving the levels of enrollment and revenues for the institution. Some of the key regions and countries that represent the international market for Acadia include India, Europe and Asia. India is considered to be the country with the highest population in the world. This is a good market for University because it presents a market with high levels of enrollment (Hunt, Bromage & Tomkinson, 2006). The university will also be able to attract international students from Asia and Europe given the fact that the two regions put much emphasis on education especially overseas education. The other opportunity within the international market is the ability of international students to pay higher fees in time. This will boost revenues for Acadia University and the money will be used in the expansion of the institution to cater for the expected increase in student enrollment (Wise, Vault Editors & Hauser, 2007). Education remains a key sector in the growth of any economy and as such the government is ready to offer assistance to the education sector. In most cases, government assistance comes in form of grants and incentives. The

History of Domestic Violence and Legislation in the UK

History of Domestic Violence and Legislation in the UK Literature Review Definition of domestic violence Domestic Violence is a phenomenon affecting many societies directly and indirectly around the world; and somehow, after many years of research not a single definition describes this phenomenon adequately yet. Defining domestic violence can be very difficult, as it is a broad term used to describe a range of behaviours and has a multiplicity of meanings to different people in different contexts (Burton, 2008). Domestic violence usually begins as an isolated abusive incident, however, when the abuse is repeated and becomes a constantly abuse, it is defined as â€Å"battering† (McCue, 2008). Physical is not the only form of domestic violence. Psychological and emotional violence are common forms of domestic violence as well (Lowenstein, 2005) and therefore the government has widened the definition of domestic violence to cover psychological intimidation and controlling behaviour and at the same time, recognising that domestic violence occurs in younger people’s intimate relationships (Walker and Gavin, 2011), applying to victims under the age of 18 as well: â€Å"any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are, or have been, intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality†. This includes psychological, physical, sexual, financial and emotional abuse (Home Office, 2013). The new Home Office definition express controlling behaviour and coercive behaviour. Controlling behaviour is a reach of acts intended to make an individual subordinate or dependent by separating them from any kind of support, not allowing them to obtain personal gain by controlling and regulating their everyday move and behaviour. Coercive behaviour is an act of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim (Home Office, 2013). As an example, The Supreme Court held in Yemshaw v. Hounslow London Borough Council [2011] that domestic violence was not confined to physical violence but extended to threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse being applied directly or indirectly (Miles, 2011). Domestic violence and abuse is not regarded of age, class, wealth, education, gender, race or any other determinant. Domestic violence is as likely to be happening to a lawyer, a doctor, a teacher, or even a police officer (Gaz, 2012). History of domestic violence Domestic violence has existed for many years and has very long historical roots and it has been establish in the inequality between men and women in society (Hague and Malous, 1998). Historically, abuse to wife has been viewed as normal which was part of marriage, something that women should expect and tolerate when being married (Erez, 2002). In the mid-1800s most legal systems accepted wife beating as a valid exercise of a husbands authority over his wife, using the â€Å"rule of thumb† established by Sir Francis Buller, known as ‘Judge Thumb’ meaning that a husband could beat his wife with a stick not thicker than his thumb (Women’s aid, 2008) and it was allowed by the old British Common Law (Dipty, 2009). Only towards the end of the twentieth century, in the 1970’s, that domestic violence had been defined as a crime, justifying intervention by the criminal justice system (Erez, 2002). Legislations Pre-1970s In the 1500s, â€Å"the Golden Age of the Rod† had been used against women in the United Kingdom who were taught that it was their sacred duty to obey the man of the house and during this time, violence against wives was ample. Mid-1800s, the Code of Hammurabi decreed that a wife was subservient to her husband and that he could inflict punishment on any member of his household for any transgression (WomenSafe, 2002). Around the same time in Britain, a husband had absolute power to chastisement his wife in order to implement domestic discipline (ICADV, 1999). During that time, there was no laws to criminalize violence against wives regardless of such assaults being included within the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, the judges did very little and sometimes did nothing to address chastisement of wives (Summers Hoffman, 2002, p.31). In the late 1800s, having the Queen Elizabeth in the throne, new reforms for women were established, some of which included that wives could no longer be kept locked and beatings that could cause life threatening were treated as a ground for divorce (Cumbee Center). The introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 helped victims of violence in marriage to obtain separation orders if their husband was convicted of aggravated assault (Summers Hoffman, 2002) and in 1882, the Woman’s Property Act, allowed wives to obtain full control over their own money and property (Parliament). Second-wave feminism In 1960s and 1970s, there was a massive comeback of feminist activity, in conjunction with the womens liberation movement. This period has been called the Second Wave of feminism, having the first wave from 1848 to 1920, when women won the right to vote (Cree, 2008). The Second Wave of feminism developed in the United States, West Europe, Australasia and Japan. However, it started in small local female groups in the United Kingdom, aiming to campaign similar private problems they all shared ( ) such as equal rights in employment, education, public and private lives and of course campaigning against rape and domestic violence (Cree, 2008) and it was then when domestic violence started to emerge as a significant issue, being recognised as a major social problem needing for political response and remedies (Summers Hoffman, 2002). The great movement established networks for support, analysing and comparing womens roles and relationships in society and defined a set of demands for the social and economic equality for women (Mendes, 2009). The women’s movement campaign was so successful that women were able to gain a stronger voice and become a strong image for the public eye, therefore a series of laws were introduced to aid women equality, such as the Equal Pay Act 1970 granting equal wages for both women and men (Mendes, 2009). Post-1970s The women’s movement was so successful that it helped with several legislations development (Hughes, 2010). There has been considerable changes in the national policy of domestic violence in the United Kingdom in the past 30 years (Matczak et al, 2001) made by the local government authorities which began to undertake and develop actions on domestic violence, and it was all mainly in response to the high demand from groups and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for the housing, social services and court and police protection for domestic violence victims (Ashworth). Some of the legislations development included the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which was passed outlawing sexual discrimination in the workplace and the Domestic Violence Act was passed in 1976 allowing married women to access court order to prevent further violence and to have the right to stay at home without the abuser (Hughes, 2010). Womens Aid was also developed as a result of the womens liberation movement and as all women gathered together, the big concern of violence at home as well as other types of abuse, including sexual abuse became highlighted. Before Women’s Aid, the organisation was the first Womens Aid federation which was set up in 1974, to provide practical and emotional support as part of the different services available to women and children experiencing violence (Women’s Aid). The 1970s brought three vital items of legislations, the Domestic Violence Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, which provide the police with powers of arrest for the breach of injunction in cases of domestic violence and allowed women to obtain the right to stay at the matrimonial home, the Domestic Proceedings Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978, which amend the use of injunctions to prevent further violence in the home and the law relating to matrimonial proceedings in magistrates’ courts and the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, which refers to persons who are homeless or threatened with homelessness which helped domestic violence victims with re-housing (UK Legislations). The acts were meant to produce legal remedies, however, the ways in which they were enforced meant that battered women continue to be inadequately protected leaving criminal law broadly untouched in terms of the protection of victims and the punishment of perpetrators of domestic violence (Summers Hoffman, 2002). However, in 1993 the Crown Prosecution Service, published a comprehensive guide for all staff to be able to deal with domestic violence cases adequately even is a victim decides to withdraw the request for prosecution which tends to happen occasionally as a result of intimidation or fear by the abuser (Ashworth). Furthermore, legislative reforms took place in the 1990s, Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 being the most significant one which improved the protective orders available to domestic violence victims under the civil law (Burton, 2008). The Family Law Act 1996 Part IV which is now the main piece of legislation providing remedies under the civil law for victims of domestic violence (Burton, 2008) provides the victim with a statutory ‘home right’ meaning the victim cannot be evicted from the home unless there is a court order (Welstead Edwards, 2011). Throughout the period between 1997 and 2010, the principle arrangement of policy and legislation on domestic violence was being enforced based on prevention, protection and justice and allowing support to victims of domestic abuse to be established at local and national level (Matczak et al, 2011). Up to dated In 1986, the Home Office published the first circular regarding domestic violence called â€Å"Violence against women† which made it clear that it was obligatory for the police to ensure the safety of women and children at domestic deputes (Applegate, 2006) but it wasn’t until 1992 that both the Home Office Circular 60/1990 and the Association of Chief Probation Officers declared domestic violence to be a crime, given law enforcement agencies the power to punish the abuser (Kury Smartt, 2006). However, it did not make much of a change to the policy (Applegate, 2006). It was not until 2005 when the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 was introduced, that put some of these issues addressed by the criminal law and when some changes to the policy where actually made. The Act aims to increase the safety of domestic violence victims by providing the police with enormous power to approach and deal with domestic violence in better ways, establishing a new offence called â€Å"familial homicide† which provides the power of arrest for minor offences of common assault and linking some criminal and civil remedies (Women’s aid) and for the criminal justice, there is a statutory code of practice to ensure they provide support and protection to victims of domestic violence (Applegate, 2006). While the law itself does not distinguish between a domestic violence victim and a person who gets attack by a stranger in the streets, in practice the victims of domestic violence rarely obtain the law’s protection (Elliot Quinn, 2012). Unlike in some jurisdictions from other countries such as the United States, there is no specific offence of domestic violence in the United Kingdom, instead, there are a variety of criminal offences including sexual and physical assault, harassment offences and the crimes related to homicide, which can be applied in a case of domestic violence (Paradine Wilkinson, 2004) Today, the government is fully committed to tackle domestic violence in the United Kingdom in every possible way by allowing violence and abuse to be treated seriously by courts and the criminal justice system (Summers Hoffman, 2002). The government’s strategy to tackle domestic violence is based on three elements; prevention, protection and justice, and support (Blunkett, 2003). The government provides some of these elements by implementing local domestic violence conventions where the police, social services, housing services, probation, health services, legal professionals, and many other voluntary agencies gather and work together to tackle domestic violence at local level (Matczak et al, 2011). Although, there have been implementations of local domestic conventions and domestic violence units as well as many multi-agencies that work together to tackle domestic violence and changes in legislation and police policy, there are still some major concerns of how domestic violence is being dealt today. In 2012, around 1.2 million women suffered domestic abuse, over 400,000 women were sexually assaulted, less than 1 in 4 suffered abuse from their partners (Home Office, 2013) and on average, two women are being killed a week by a partner or former partner (CAADA, 2013). Furthermore, the police have been majorly criticised for failing to respond to domestic violence properly by not recording incidents as crimes (Paradine Wilkinson, 2004) with a 30% of domestic violence incidents reported to the police but not taken into actions and only 4% of reported incidents resulting in a conviction (Women’s aid) and they have been also criticised for not making arrests and failing to enforce civil injunctions (Paradine Wilkinson, 2004). For these reasons, in September 2013, the Home Secretary has commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to carry out an inspection into how police forces are responding to domestic violence and the review will be exanimating the performance of all forces around England and Wales and report back to the Home Office in April 2014. In the meantime, chapter 2.4 and 2.5 will be looking at the reporting and non-reporting of incidents and how the police is responding to domestic incidents after the establishment of domestic violence units were introduced across the country, and assess the changes in police policy and practice over the past years including the ‘pro-arrest’ policy which aims to reduce the number of domestic violence cases discontinued by the police or the Crown Prosecution Service (Hoyle Sanders, 2000). References Applegate, R.J., 2006. Changing local policy and practice towards the policing of domestic violence in England and Wales. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies Management. 29 (2): 368 – 383. Blunkett, D., 2003. Safety and Justice: The Government’s Proposals on Domestic Violence. Home Office. Norwich. Burton, M., 2008. Legal responses to Domestic Violence. Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish. CAADA (Co-ordinated Action Against Domestic Abuse). Key statistics on the prevalence of domestic abuse [online]. Bristol: Co-ordinated Action Against Domestic Abuse. Available from: http://www.caada.org.uk/policy/statistics.html. [Accessed 17 January 2014]. Cree, V., 2008. Feminism: Past It, Lost Cause or Unfinished Revolution? [online]. University of Edinburgh Social Work Seminar. Available from: http://www.socialwork.ed.ac.uk/events/lecture_notes/feminism_lecture. [Accessed 6th February 2014]. Cumbee Center. History of Domestic Violence [online]. Cumbee Center to Assist Abused Persons. Available from: http://www.cumbeecenter.org/domestic_violence_history.php. [Accessed 6th February 2014]. Dipty, D., 2009. The Three Dimensions of Domestic Violence. Oklahoma: Tate Publishing Enterprises. Elliot, C. and Quinn, F., 2012. Criminal Law. Ninth Edition. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited Erez, E., 2002. Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview. Online Journal of Issues in Nursing [online]. 7 (1). Gaz, LS., 2012. Features: How to stop domestic Violence. Law Society Gazette [online]. 41. Home Office., 2013. Domestic violence and abuse [online]. Home Office. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/domestic-violence-and-abuse. [Accessed 4th February 2014]. Home Office, 2013. Ending violence against women and girls in the UK [online]. Home Office. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-in-the-uk [Accessed 4th February 2014]. Hoyle, C. and Sanders, A., 2000. Police Response to Domestic Violence. The British Journal of Criminology [online], 40 (1): 14-36. Hughes, C., 2010. Second Wave Feminism [online]. Available from: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/academicstaff/jonesc/jonesc_index/teaching/birth/second_wave_feminism.pdf. [Accessed 11th February 2014]. ICADV, 1999. History of Battered Women’s Movement [online]. SafeNetwork: California’s Domestic Violence Resource. Available from: http://www.icadvinc.org/what-is-domestic-violence/history-of-battered-womens-movement/. [Accessed 6th February 2014]. Kury, H. and Smartt, U., 2006. Domestic Violence: Recent Developments in German and English Legislation and Law Enforcement. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. 14 (4): 382-407. Lowenstein, L.F., 2005. Domestic Violence: Recent Research Part 1. Justice of the Peace [online]. 196 (37). Matczak, A., Hatzidimitriadou, E., and Lindsay, J., 2011. Review of Domestic Violence Policies in England and Wales. London: Kingston University and St George‘s, University of London. Mendes, K., 2009. Reporting the womens movement: A cross-national comparison of representations of second wave feminism and equal rights issues in the United Kingdom and United States daily press, 1968-1982. Cardiff University. Paradine, K. and Wilkinson, J., 2004. A Research and Literature Review Protection and Accountability: The Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases [online]. National Centre for Policing Excellence, Centrex. Parliament. Key dates [online]. Parliament United Kingdom. Available from: http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/relationships/keydates/, [Accessed 6th February 2014]. Summers, R. and Hoffman, A.M., 2002. Domestic Violence: A Global View. Westport: Greenwood Press. United Kingdom Legislations. Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 [online]. United Kingdom. Available from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/48/introduction/enacted. [Accessed 11th February 2014]. Welstead, M. and Edwards, S., 2011. Family Law. Third Edition. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. Women’s aid, 2008. Domestic Violence a historical perspective [online]. Women’s aid. Available from: http://www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp?itemid=1815itemTitle=A+historical+perspectivesection=00010001002200410001sectionTitle=Articles:+domestic+violence. [Accessed 4th February 2014]. Women’s aid. Our history [online]. Women’s aid. Available from: http://www.womensaid.org.uk/page.asp?section=0001000100190004 [Accessed 4th February 2014]. Women Safe, 2002. Overview of Historical Laws that Supported Domestic Violence [online]. Women Safe. Available from: http://www.womensafe.net/dv/dvlaws.html. [Accessed 3rd February 2014].

Comparing Walt Whitman and Ralph Emerson :: comparison compare contrast essays

Comparing Walt Whitman and Ralph Emerson Walt Whitman is Jay Leno and Ralph Emerson is Ed Hall. Walt takes the instructions announced by Emerson and runs gallantly with them making beautiful and insightful poetry. Walt Whitman and Ralph Emerson spoke out in an age where society was not ready for such dramatic writers. Whitman uses several of Emerson's topics and styles to be that good poet. Whitman elaborates on the characteristics of a poet, freedom, children, and animals. In order to understand any comparison of the two author's one must first read and comprehend that Emerson's writing are clearly an instruction manual that Whitman adopts in order to become an outstanding poet. Emerson believes we must, "look in vain for the poet whom I describe. We do not, with sufficient plainness, or sufficient profoundness, address ourselves to life, nor dare we chaunt our own times and social circumstances. If we filled the day with bravery, we should not shrink from celebrating it. Time and nature yield us many gifts, but not yet the timely man, the new religion, the reconciler, whom all things await" (Emerson 1653). Emerson is stating how everything can be a poem and a poet can reflect on valuable resources like nature to draw on and write. Whitman clearly uses this guide in order to write his poetry. He agrees that nature is a valuable tool. In addition, Whitman elaborates that any person and any nature is in itself poet and poem. He thinks America is full of poets. Whitman reflects saying, "I celebrate myself, and what I assume you shall assume, for every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. I loafe and invite my soul . . . houses and rooms full of perfumes . . . the shelves are crowed with perfumes" (Whitman 2743). Whitman expresses himself and how he wants others to take notice and realize poetry is all around. People want freedom, and this characteristic is a focus in both poet's works. In Emerson freedom is referred to as, "the ancient British bards had for the title of their order, 'Those who are free throughout the world.' They are free, and they make free"(Emerson 1657).

Equity and Trusts: Barnes V Addy Second Limb

Introduction This paper examines the development and scope of accessory liability under the second limb of Barnes v Addy as it stands in both England and Australia. As to the law in England, the focus will be on the rearticulation of the principle of accessory liability under the second limb as stated in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. In particular, it will consider the extent to which the decision has reconciled inconsistencies in earlier authority and remedied those issues propounded to be inherent in the traditional formulation of the principle. At this stage, this traditional principle remains good law in Australia.However, as suggested in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, there is potential for the English approach to be adopted in the Australian context. Such an adoption may be advisable in light of the judicial and extra-judicial commentary suggesting that the orthodox approach is in fact not properly aligned with equitable principles. The discussion of this possibility involves not only an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, but also a determination as to the extent to which the separate application of each approach could result in a divergent outcome.The development of the second limb of Barnes v Addy in Australia- ‘knowing assistance’ The classic authority on the circumstances in which third parties will be held accountable for their involvement in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty is the English case of Barnes v Addy. It was in this case that Lord Selbourne LC articulated the much cited and analysed statement of principle that has come to form the modern law: †¦ trangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees†¦unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. This statement has come to be understood as allowing liability to be imputed on a party in two distinct circumstances, where the third party either knowingly receives trust property, or assists with knowledge in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty.This paper seeks only to consider the latter. In what ostensibly remains the authoritative case on this second limb of Barnes v Addy in Australia, the High Court in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd, (‘Consul Development v DPC’) not unlike other cases at the time, focussed predominantly on the level of knowledge which would be sufficient to attract accessory liability in the circumstances before them.The primary question was not one of the dishonesty or otherwise of the actions of the third party, but of that third party’s knowledge of the dishonesty of the fiduciary. The majority, it seems, realised that the terms ‘constructive notice’ and ‘actual notice’ did not in themselves comprise the requisite sophisti cation for dealing with the matter of the knowledge of the third party.They instead expressed the required degree of knowledge within particular parameters, with neither Stephen J nor Gibbs J willing to extend these parameters to include a negligent failure to inquire on behalf of the third party. In Equiticorp Finance Ltd v Bank of New Zealand, Kirby P (in dissent) indicated support for the Consul test of knowledge, and attempted to clarify the judgement in Consul Development v DPC with reference to the decision in Baden, Delvaxs & Lecuit v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Development du Commerce et de L’Industrie en France SA (‘Baden’).He equated the degrees of knowledge set out by the High Court in Consul Development v DPC with the first four categories as stated in Baden thereby confirming that both actual and constructive knowledge, but not constructive notice, would constitute the requisite degree of knowledge necessary to render a third party liable unde r the second limb of Barnes v Addy. Similar findings have been made in later cases where Consul Development v DPC has been declared authority on the matter, although such an explicit reference to the Baden scale is not always present.Conversely, other judges have found the judgement in Consul Development v DPC to be inconclusive, adopting a narrow interpretation of the judgement of Stephen J and restricting the requisite knowledge only to the first three categories of the Baden scale. This tendency toward a narrow approach increased following the decision in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (‘Royal Brunei’) as courts attempted to reconcile the UK and Australian lines of authority.However in other cases, such as Gertsch v Atsas it was held that that the acceptance of the first four Baden categories was synonymous with accepting a standard of honesty. Given the discordant state of the Australian authorities, the High Court took the opportunity in Farah Constructions Pt y Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, (‘Farah Constructions’) to clarify the Australian position on knowing assistance.Their Honours declared, in obiter, that Australian courts should continue to follow the decision in Consul Development v DPC, thereby continuing to see as necessary the requirement of a dishonest design on the part of the fiduciary, and subscribing to the proposition that where the third party’s knowledge falls within the first four categories of the Baden scale it will answer the requirement of knowledge under the second limb of Barnes v Addy.In what has been referred to as a â€Å"profound shift in the rules of judicial engagement† following Farah Constructions, lower courts have regarded themselves as obligated to follow the obiter of the High Court and have thus returned to an orthodox approach. However, the law in Australia is far from settled on this point and a case is yet to come before the High Court with the facts necessary to allow for a rec onsideration of the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Royal Brunei. The development of the second limb of Barnes v Addy in England- ‘dishonest assistance’While in Australia the courts are returning to an orthodox approach towards accessory liability, in England, the courts are grappling with a reformulation of the principles under the second limb of Barnes v Addy following the decision in Royal Brunei. In this case, the Privy Council refocussed the relevant inquiry in cases concerning liability under the second limb of Barnes v Addy away from the third party’s knowledge of the trustee’s dishonesty, to the dishonesty of the accessory themselves.Consequently, the dishonesty (or lack thereof) of the trustee or fiduciary is irrelevant as it is the dishonesty on the part of the accessory that attracts liability. There is nothing new about the application of a dishonesty-based in inquiry into the liability of accessories to a breach of fiduciary duty , with Lord Nicholls suggesting that before the inquiry â€Å"donned its Barnes v Addy strait-jacket† judges hadn’t regarded themselves as confined to inquiries into the levels of knowledge of the accessory.It may even be said that the dishonesty-based inquiry had retained its place in contemporary law prior to Royal Brunei, and that it was merely obscured by the additional and more tedious requirement of determining the level of knowledge of the accessory. For example, in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson Millet J stated: There is no sense in requiring dishonesty on the part of the principal while accepting negligence as sufficient for his assistant.Dishonest furtherance of the dishonest scheme of another is an understandable basis for liability; negligent but honest failure to appreciate that someone else's scheme is dishonest is not. This can be set alongside other cases which suggest that that the requirement of dishonesty on the part of the principle is in fact a compel ling reason not to require dishonesty on the part of the fiduciary, as they are an ‘accessory’ who merely needs to be is linked to the conduct of the principle. Millet J, however, seemingly wishes to see this principle extended, so that dishonesty is required on the part of both parties.The decision in Royal Brunei does not precisely echo this formulation of the dishonestly principle (Lord Nicholls ultimately went on to conclude that that the fiduciary need not be dishonest at all in order for the accessory to be held accountable), but instead clarifies and affirms a general principle in light of other commentary on the point. Consequently, Lord Nicholls in his judgement has set out what is necessary for the inquiry into the accessory’s dishonesty, stating that courts should look to determine whether the person acted â€Å"as an honest person would in the circumstances† in light of their actual knowledge at the time.He further explains that the question sh ould be approached objectively and indicates that the test is not one of the ‘reasonable person’. He seeks to clarify this test of dishonesty with the following examples: If a person knowlingly appropriates another’s property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour†¦Honest people do not knowingly take other’s property†¦[or] participate in a transaction if he knows it involves a misapplication of trust assets to the detriment of the beneficiaries.Nor does an honest person in such a case deliberately close his eyes and ears, or deliberately not ask questions, lest he learn something he would rather not know, then proceed regardless. This passage, while meant to further explain the test for dishonesty, initially seems difficult to reconcile with later comments, where his Lordship makes explicit reference to the departure from the orthodox inquiry into degrees of knowledge, stating that the w ord â€Å"knowlingly† should be avoided and that the Baden scale was â€Å"best forgotten†.While it seems unproblematic to abandon the Baden scale of knowledge, commentators and courts alike have found difficultly in divorcing the concept of dishonesty from knowledge itself and the most recent authoritative decision on the point Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd (‘Barlow Clowes’) confirms that an inquiry into dishonesty does to some degree require an inquiry into the knowledge of the third party. Comparison of the English and Australian position One of the objectives of the court in Royal Brunei was to remedy some of the problems with the orthodox approach to accessory liability.Such problems were not only present in English courts, but have also plagued Australian courts and were not resolved in by the High Court’s affirmation of the knowledge-based test in Farah Constructions. Firstly, Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei soug ht to realign the principles of accessory liability with equitable doctrines and focussed primarily on the conscience of the accessory themselves. In the orthodox approach, as expressed in Consul Developments v DPC, the inquiry is not into the state of mind of the accessory themselves but into the accessory’s knowledge of another’s state of mind.It has been suggested that the inquiry has thus been misplaced, and that although it results in an indirect finding of dishonesty on the part of the accessory, it is much further removed from equitable principles than the Royal Brunei approach. Lord Nicholls also sought to do away with the confusion surrounding the need for judges to distinguish between the different levels of knowledge, in particular constructive knowledge and constructive notice.However, as noted above, Lord Nicholls on several occasions makes reference to the knowledge of the accessory which is the reason that the degree to which the test of dishonesty is di vorced from an inquiry into knowledge has been questioned. However, what must be realised here is that the inquiry into knowledge that is embarked upon as part of the dishonesty based approach is different to that which was required under the knowledge based approach.This redirection for the knowledge inquiry was first considered in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley where a difficulty arose in determining whether Lord Nicholls had intended for an objective or subjective approach to be taken to dishonesty. In the leading judgement, Lord Hutton tendered the â€Å"combined test† which required that the third party’s conduct be dishonest by the standards of the reasonable person as well as requiring an appreciation by the third party that by those standards his or her conduct was dishonest.This combined test endured much academic criticism and was seen as being inconsistent with the objective test enunciated by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei. The Privy Council, and in particular, Lo rd Hoffman (who was in the majority in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley) had the opportunity in Barlow Clowes to clarify the comments made in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley. It was stated that the majority in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley had, in fact, always espoused a test in line with that which was conceptualised in Royal Brunei and it was commentators who had skewed this test into a different form.Despite the contempt that many commentators had for this account, the statement of a complete principle of dishonest assistance was applauded. Incorporated in this principle was the conclusion that the liability of the accessory was not dependant on a requirement for fraud or dishonesty on the part of the fiduciary, but depended solely upon whether the accessory was at fault. This is the converse position of the orthodox approach, whereby a third party can escape liability even where they know they are assisting in a breach of fiduciary duty, provided that the fiduciary was not acting dishonestly.Thomas J in Powell v Thompson held that protecting a person with a guilty conscience in this manner was not in line with equitable principles, and his consequent assertion that the conduct of the principle should be irrelevant was later approved in Brunei. One significant consequence of the divergent approaches in what are currently the UK and Australian positions on this matter would be the substantial difference in outcome in cases where the fiduciary had acted innocently.Provided that all other requirements are satisfied, in the UK the accessory would be held liable however in Australia they would not. Further to this, while some Australian judges have found it difficult to distinguish the traditional approach from that of Royal Brunei, the fact that the orthodox reliance on the Baden scale restricts investigations only to knowledge and not to other attributes or types of conduct, lends weight to the argument that in certain circumstances there would be divergent outcomes of the two ap proaches. Perhaps, it is best to take FarahConstructions as authority on this point, with the High Court in this case imputing that one of the reasons it is directing courts to treat the approaches distinctly is due to the potential for the different formulations of the principle to lead to different results. Conclusion In line with the arguments presented in this paper, it is submitted that the approach to accessory liability espoused in Royal Brunei is preferable to that which was propounded in Consul Development v DPC due what is an ostensible irreconcilability of the latter case with conventional equitable doctrines.This assertion turns on the manner in which the judges in Consul Development v DPC dealt with the requirement for a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the fiduciary as per Lord Selbourne LC in Barnes v Addy. Like many other cases at the time, Consul Development v DPC was concerned more with attempts to define what Lord Selbourne had meant by a â€Å"dish onest and fraudulent design† rather than questioning whether it was an appropriate criterion for the imposition of liability on a third party.Consequently, when it came to fulfilling equity's calls as to inquiries into the conscience of the defendant, courts were misguided and came to focus instead on the conscience of the principle. The arguments in favour of the retention of this approach are largely set out in reliance on the requirement that the third party be implicated in the conduct of the fiduciary. However, as suggested in Royal Brunei, assistance in itself should be enough to draw a sufficient connection between the accessory and the fiduciary.It was this realisation which enabled Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei to reformulate the principle under the second limb of Barnes v Addy so as to redirect inquiries into the minds of defendants to their appropriate place in accordance with equitable principles. Although the adoption of the approach in Brunei may not result in ma jor shift in the law of accessory liability in Australia, it’s contemplation of circumstances in which the third party can be held liable even where the fiduciary is innocent would at the very least resolve the seemingly inequitable approach to this point as it stands in current Australian law. Bibliography Articles/Books/Reports Aitken, L, ‘Unforgiven: Some thoughts on Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd' (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 195 Andrews, G, ‘The redundancy of dishonest assistance’ (2003) 8 Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 1 Birks, P, ‘Misdirected funds: Restitution from the Recipient’ (1989) Lloyds Maritime & Commercial LQ 296 Chambers, R, ‘Knowing Receipt: Frozen In Australia' (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 40 Cope, M, ‘A comparative evaluation of developments in equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust' [2006] QUT Law Journal 7Cope, M, Equitable Obligations: Duties, Defences and Rem edies (2008), Lawbook Co, Pyrmont. Hoffman, L, ‘The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance’ in Birks, P (ed), The Frontiers of Liability, (1994) vol 1, Oxford University Press, New York Dietrich, J & Ridge, P †The receipt of what? ‘: questions concerning third party recipient liability in equity and unjust enrichment' [2007] Melbourne University Law Review 3 Harding, M & Malkin, I, ‘The High Court of Australia’s Obiter Dicta and Decision-Making in Lower Courts’ 34 Sydney Law Review 2 Kirby, M, ‘Equity's Australian Isolationism' (2008) 8 Melbourne University Law Review 2Kiri, N, ‘Recipient and accessory liability- where do we stand now? ’ (2006) 21 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 11 Loughlan, P L, ‘Liability for Assistance in a Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ (1989) 9 Oxford Leg Studies 260 Mason, K, ‘President Mason’s Farewell Speech’ (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 11 Ong, D, à ¢â‚¬ËœThe Knowledge or Role that makes a Person an Accessory under the Barnes v Addy Principle’ (2005) 17 Bond Law Review 6 Radan, P ; Stewart, C, Principles of Australian Equity ; Trusts, (2010), LexisNexis Australia, ChatswoodSullivan, G R, ‘Framing an Acceptable General Offence of Fraud’ (1989) 53 Journal of Criminal Law 92 Thomas, S B, ‘Knowing Receipt and Knowing Assistance: Where do we stand? ’ (1997) 20 UNSW Law Journal 1 Thornton, R, ‘Dishonest Assistance: Guilty Conscience or Guilty Mind? ’ [2002] 61 Cambridge Law Journal 3 ? Case Law Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265 Air Canada v M;L Travel Ltd (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 592 Attorney-General v Corporation of Leicester (1844) 7 Beav 176 ASIC v AS Nominees (1995) 133 ALR 1Baden Delvaux ; Lecuit v Societe Generale pour Favorisier le Developpment du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA [1992] 4 All ER 279 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 All ER 333 Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 214 Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411 Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith ; Co (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 276 Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard [No 4] [2008] WASC 21 Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Hepburn (No 4) [2011] FCA 509 DPC Estates v Grey [1974] 1 NSWLR 433 Eagle Trust plc v SPC Securities Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 489 Eaves v Hickson (1861) 30 Beav 136 Equiticorp Finance Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 32 NSWLR 50 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 Flyer v Flyer (1841) 3 Beav 141 Gertsch v Atsas(1999) 10 BPR 18,431 John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd; Walker Corp Pty Ltd vWhite City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden [1972 ] 1 All ER 1210 Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 428Lipkin Gorman v Kapnale Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 451 Maher v Millenium Markets Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 174 NCR Australia Pty Ltd v Credit Connection Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 111 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd v General Cologne Re Australia Ltd [2004] NSWSC 781 Ninety Five Pty Ltd in liq v Banque Nationale de Paris [1988] WAR 132 Powell v Thompson [1991] NZLR 597 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan Kok Ming [1995] 2 AC 378 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 155 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 Voss v Davidson & Ors [2002] QSC 316 Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd v Marshall (2005) 219 ALR 11

Microhabitat Variation

Temperature results for this observational study show that temperature mean and standard deviation values vary as you go from one location to another. These results are basically affected by several factors. One factor for example is the amount of sunlight received by a particular area. Shaded locations, such as under a holly tree and another tree near the shore pond registered lower mean temperatures (20.55 C and 21.03 C respectively) compared to those areas that are more exposed to direct sunlight such as the sunny patch of grass (31.60 C) and at the bleachers (28.52 C). exposure to direct sunlight obviously increases the temperature of a certain area while the absence of it decreases the temperature. Also, the canopy of the trees hinders the sunlight to penetrate the area under it thus, contributing to the lowering of the temperature of the said locations. The amount of sunlight that enters the Earth has great effect on air temperature. But as sunlight passes through the air, it does not heat it but rather, warms the air above the liquids (streams, ponds) and solids (soil) on the Earth. Usually, the warmest time of the day is the middle because it is when the sunlight is directly hitting these liquids and solids. â€Å"Temperature is usually low at midnight, decreasing in the early hours of the morning, and then increasing rapidly until just after midday. It then decreases during the night† (http://www.niwascience.co.nz/edu/resources/climate/plots/). Also, it is warmer during summer because there are more time for the Earth’s surface to heat up as compared during winter time. This event is also observable inside a thermometer, an instrument used to measure temperature. The liquid inside this instrument expands and goes up when the air surrounding it is warm. During colder days on the other hand, the liquid contracts and goes down. On the other hand, the temperature values observed under a tree showed a larger standard deviation (32.74) as compared to other areas observed. This can be explained by the fact that trees have the ability to reduce wind and air circulation especially in humid climates. Large trees with dense foliage can limit air circulation on hot days and increase the landscape's humidity by decreasing the amount of available sunlight. The lower a tree's branches are to the ground, the more it contributes to an airless space (http:www.). Variations on the activities of the tree in order to adapt to the existing sunlight amount caused the wide range of temperature values observed in this specific location. The scatterplot shows that the average temperatures of the study locations and the number of animals observed on those locations have no significant relationship with one another as proven by a high P value (0.135). Also, the two variables have a weak positive relationship as shown by a positive R value (0.377). These observations mean that although the two variables have no significant relationship, it should still be noted that they have a positive and direct relationship, which means that as the average temperatures of the study locations increases, so does the number of animals observed on those locations and vice versa. The abovementioned observations can be explained by the fact that animals’ survival is greatly affected by any change in their surrounding environment’s temperature. According to Liebig's Law of the Minimum, â€Å"population growth will be limited by the required factor that is in shortest supply† (http://www.utm.edu/departments/cens/biology/rirwin/441_442/441PhysEc.htm). The factor in shortest supply can be called as the limiting factor which determines the abundance or lack of a certain number of animals and other organisms and it can either be an abiotic of biotic factor. In this experiment, we regarded the temperature as the main abiotic factor under observation. Different animals have different tolerance levels for different factors affecting their survival. For temperature, â€Å"eurythermals† have wide range of tolerance for temperatures while â€Å"stenothermal† refers to those who have narrow tolerance for temperature. These mean that if a certain organism or group of organism cannot adapt to an environment with limiting factors that are necessary for their survival, or they cannot tolerate any drastic increase or decrease in temperature, they may be unable to reproduce or worse, die. Another explanation for this event is the ability of animal for thermoregulation. â€Å"Thermoregulation is the ability of an organism to keep its body temperature within certain boundaries, even when temperature surrounding is very different† (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermoregulation). It one process of homeostasis which is a vigorous condition of constancy between an animal’s internal and external environments. In relation to this, there are two conditions that can happen to an organism when it cannot regulate its internal and external environments and maintain its normal temperature. One is hyperthermia, this can happen when an organism’s body temperature significantly increases above normal. On the other hand, it’s opposite is known as hypothermia wherein the body temperature decreases below the normal level. When an organism suffers any of these two conditions, it can be very fatal. These concepts only prove that the average temperatures of the study area and the number of animals found in each observed area have a direct relationship with one another. And these can happen either during the hot day or cold day but may have different manifestations depending on the kind of organism and how it adapts to the changes in its environment. Animals tend to prefer microclimates that show very little variation in temperature because it will be of great cost to them if they always have to regulate their body temperatures in order to adapt to their environment. And in vice versa, it will be of great help to them if they do not need to do this anymore because they will save up their energy for other metabolic processes such as reproduction or food storage and consumption. Sources: Lecture: Physiological Ecology. Retrieved November 8, 2006, from   http://www.utm.edu/departments/cens/biology/rirwin/441_442/441PhysEc.htm Mackintoch, L. Answers to Questions. Retrieved November 8, 2006, from   http://www.niwascience.co.nz/edu/resources/climate/plots/ Streich A., Janssen D., Gaussoin R., and Rodie S. (2003, July). Landscapes for Shade. Retrieved November 8, 2006 Sunlight's Effect on Air Temperature. Retrieved November 8, 2006 from http://science.howstuffworks.com/question651.htm Thermoregulation.   Retrieved November 8, 2006 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermoregulation